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Corrective Justice and Copyright 
Infringement 
Patrick R. Goold* 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article demonstrates that one important goal of copyright 
infringement cases is the achievement of corrective justice. The 
importance of corrective justice to the copyright system is demonstrated 
by the law’s continual reliance on a bilateral litigation model. Sadly, 
because scholars and lawmakers often conceive of copyright in solely 
economic terms, corrective justice is often overlooked and demonstrable 
unfairness occurs as a result. This Article discusses three areas of 
contemporary copyright law where the failure to consider corrective 
justice leads to unfair outcomes: the provision of statutory damages in 
civil copyright claims, the availability of attorney’s fees, and mass 
copyright settlements. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN TORT LAW ................................... 258 
A. The Economic Theory of Tort Law ................................ 258 
B. Problems with the Economic Theory of Tort Law .......... 261 
1. Tort’s Bilateral Structure ................................... 262 
2. Actual Causation................................................ 265 
C. Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law .......................... 266 
II.  CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ...... 270 
A. The Economic Theory of Copyright ............................... 271 
B. Problems with the Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Infringement ................................................................ 272 
 
 *  The author would like to thank the following people for their invaluable assistance 
on this project: Pamela Samuelson, Talha Syed, Robert Merges, Peter Menell, Molly Van 
Houweling, Chris Hoofnagle, Jennifer Urban, Robert Cooter, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
Abraham Drassinower, Steven Sugarman, Mark Gergen, Oren Bracha, all of the participants at 
the Seton Hall Works in Progress in Intellectual Property Conference, all of the participants at 
the Cardozo Law School Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and the editors of the 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law. Any and all mistakes are due to the 
author. Please send feedback and comments to patrickgoold@law.berkeley.edu.   
252 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:2:251 
1. Copyright’s Bilateral Structure .......................... 272 
2. Copying and Independent Re-creation ............... 275 
C. Corrective Justice Theory and Copyright Infringement. 279 
1. Copyright Remedies ........................................... 282 
III. CORRECTIVE INJUSTICES IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT .... 284 
A. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement ................ 285 
1. Punitive Civil Damages Are Unjust ................... 285 
2. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement as 
Dignitary Harm ................................................. 287 
B. Attorney’s Fees .............................................................. 289 
C. Mass Copyright Infringement Settlements .................... 290 
IV.  CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 294 
 
Copyright law provides authors with an exclusive right to copy 
their literary and artistic works.1  If someone copies the work without 
permission, the author can sue that person for a remedy.2  Why is this 
the case?  Why can the author sue the infringer for compensation?  
Unlike the dominant theories of copyright, this Article answers these 
questions by appealing to corrective justice theory.  Although it is 
often forgotten, one central purpose of copyright infringement cases is 
the correction of past injustices.  Sadly, as scholars, legislatures, and 
judges typically conceive of copyright solely in economic terms, this 
important function is often overlooked, and demonstrable unfairness 
occurs as a result.3 
While the initial grant of copyright may be proprietary in 
nature,4 the act of infringing copyright is a tort.5  It follows that 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 2. See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2012). 
 3. See infra Part III. 
 4. The question of whether intellectual property rights are proprietary or personal in 
nature is one of the longest standing issues of copyright law. For modern views on this issue, see, 
for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 108 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of 
Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?]; 
Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997); 
Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 
YALE L.J. 1742 (2007); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 
(2008). Other scholars have demonstrated concern for such discussion of intellectual property 
rights as analogous to real property. See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of 
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 
1119 (1983); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003); 
Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing 
Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 396–97 (1989) (expressing 
desire that “the first amendment’s protection of free speech interests will serve as some check on 
the reach of the information as property doctrine.”).  
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understanding the function of copyright infringement cases requires 
consideration of the purposes of tort law generally,6 of which there are 
two: the promotion of economic welfare and the achievement of 
corrective justice.7  The former theory states that tort law is a tool for 
maximizing welfare.8  As accidents are costly for society, tort law 
exists to deter people from causing them in inefficient amounts.9  
 
 5. See, e.g., Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 633–34 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Fundamentally, 
proving the basic tort of infringement simply requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant 
had an actual opportunity to copy the original . . . and that the two works share enough unique 
features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another’s work.”); Brayton Purcell LLP v. 
Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Here, the underlying action is 
copyright infringement, which is often characterized as a tort.” (citing Columbia Pictures 
Television v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284, 289 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d, 
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998))); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. 
Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (“Rights secured by copyright are property within the 
meaning of the law of copyright, and whoever invades that property beyond the privilege 
conceded to subsequent authors commits a tort . . . .”). Much like the case when someone invades 
the property right of another, they cause the tort of trespass, the infringement of copyright is a 
tort. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property Along the Tort Spectrum: Trespass to 
Chattels and the Anglo-American Doctrinal Divergence, 35 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 135, 137–43 
(2006) (analyzing the tort of trespass to chattels with a focus on the common law actual damage 
requirement). 
 6. In recent years, a number of scholars have started to examine how intellectual 
property overlaps with tort. See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright 
Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009); Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2011); Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: 
“Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Mirror Image]; Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, 
and Intellectual Property, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Of Harms and 
Benefits]; Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation 
and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH 
401 (1998); A. Samuel Oddi, Product Simulation: From Tort to Intellectual Property, 88 
TRADEMARK REP. 101, 101 (1998); see also Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: 
Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for 
Conduct Occurring Over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729 (1996); Peter S. 
Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort 
Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007); Peter S. Menell, The 
Mixed Heritage of Federal Intellectual Property Law and Ramifications for Statutory 
Interpretation (forthcoming 2013); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 941, 994–96 (2007); Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry 
and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962); A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory 
Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological Tensions, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47 (1989). 
 7. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997). 
 8. See, e.g., ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 322–65 (5th ed. 
2008); see also John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound 
Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive 
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1980). Nevertheless, empirical studies 
suggest scholarly opinion is still divided on the efficiency of tort doctrines. See John C. 
Moorhouse, Andrew P. Morriss & Robert Whaples, Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey of 
Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 694 (1998). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–212 (6th ed. 2003). 
 9. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 346.   
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Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this is the only function of the law.  
Standing alone, the economic goal does not justify a central feature of 
tort law, i.e. the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.10  It 
does not explain why the defendant should pay this particular plaintiff 
a remedy.11  All that is needed to deter people from causing accidents 
is to make the defendant pay a penalty to someone when his conduct 
results in injury.12  It does not matter greatly to the defendant who 
that someone is.13  The deterrence rationale will equally be fulfilled if 
the defendant’s inefficient actions result in him paying a criminal fine, 
civil damages, or a donation to a third party (e.g., a charity).14 
Tort scholars typically explain this feature by appealing to 
tort’s second function: corrective justice.15  The relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant exists because those who cause another 
harm have a duty to correct that harm.16  The desirability of correction 
itself flows from the importance of equality.17  People are equally 
entitled to the resources they hold (including their property and legal 
rights).18  When people interact with one another, they ought to 
respect the equality of the other individual.19  Tortious conduct is 
wrongful because it creates an inequality.20  The action allows the 
tortfeasor to gain something at the expense of the victim.21  For 
example, if a tortfeasor steals a car, he gains what the victim loses: a 
 
 10. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13–24 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 46–48 (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, 
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]; Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1248–53 
(1988) [hereinafter Coleman, Structure]. 
 11. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18; WEINRIB, IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 47. 
 12. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18.  
 13. See id.  
 14. See id.  
 15. See id. at 1–63; JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361–85 (2002) [hereinafter 
COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS]; ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 9–37 (2012) 
[hereinafter WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE]; WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 
56–83. Other notable corrective justice theories in tort can be found elsewhere. See John Borgo, 
Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of 
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort 
Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992); Frederick L. Sharp, Aristotle, Justice and Enterprise Liability in the 
Law of Torts, 34 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 84 (1976); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, not 
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003). 
 16. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 15.  
 17. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 58–66. 
 18. See id. at 61–66. 
 19. See id.  
 20. See id.  
 21. See id.  
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car.  The law exists to correct the resulting inequality.22  By making 
the defendant compensate the plaintiff, the law removes the wrongful 
gain and the wrongful loss arising from the interaction.23  The remedy 
puts the parties back into their original positions and restores the 
antecedent equilibrium.24  Tort therefore is not merely about 
efficiency; it is also about equity.25 
Copyright scholars and lawmakers typically say that copyright 
is also an economic tool for welfare maximization.26  Society enjoys 
literary and artistic works, but these works may be underproduced 
due to a market failure.27  Creating works entails high fixed costs.28  
Authors29 must invest extensive resources, such as time and money, to 
produce the work’s first copy.30  Many authors would not undertake 
such an investment if they could not later recover those costs.31  
Copyright solves this problem by providing the author with market 
exclusivity, allowing him to sell subsequent copies of the work at a 
price above marginal cost.32  This enables him to recover his fixed cost 
 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. For perspectives on both efficiency and equity considerations in tort, see, for 
example, Robert D. Cooter, Liberty, Efficiency, and Law, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (1987); 
Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 187 (1981) [hereinafter Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice]; Richard A. Posner, The 
Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 487 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 103 (1979); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997); Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective 
Justice, 50 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice].  
 26. See, e.g., RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY: FRIENDS OR FOES?  
11–15 (2000); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of 
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 5–6 (1991); Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics 
of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397 (2012); 
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–14 (1982) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Fair Use]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–33 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law]; Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 
(1934). But see Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 
56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966) (noting criticism of copyright as an economic tool for welfare 
maximization). 
 27. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at  
326–33. 
 28. See id.  
 29. The term “author” throughout the article is used to include the first creator of the 
work as well people to whom the copyright is subsequently transferred.  
 30. See id.  
 31. See id.  
 32. See id.  
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and gives him an incentive to produce the work in the first place.33  
When infringement threatens his ability to recover the creative 
investment, the author can sue the infringer as a second-best way to 
recover his lost fixed costs. 
It is often unrecognized, however, that the economic goal is 
unlikely to be the only function of copyright infringement suits.  Once 
again, the economic goal does not justify the relationship between the 
two relevant parties.  The economic theory does not state why the 
author must receive compensation from this particular infringer.  If 
the only goal of copyright is to incentivize the author to create works, 
all the author needs is a reward for creation.  It does not matter 
particularly where that reward comes from.34  The government could 
subsidize creation, or prizes could be awarded for the publication of 
popular works.35  In both cases, the author would have an incentive to 
 
 33. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The 
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) 
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975))); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (“It is evident that the monopoly 
granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new 
material of potential historical value.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that copyright is “intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair 
return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate 
artistic creativity for the general public good.”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 
U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the 
public of the products of his creative genius.”); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in 
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996) (“[I]t is incentive language that pervades the 
Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence.”). 
 34. This is demonstrated by the current discussion on alternative compensation 
mechanisms for authors where some academics favor abandoning the current copyright system 
in favor of an alternative system, which does not require authors to sue infringers. See, e.g., 
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 199–258 (2004); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: 
When is it the Best Incentive System?, in  2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Jaffe et al. 
eds., 2002); Ville Oksanen & Mikko Välimäki, Copyright Levies as an Alternative Compensation 
Method for Recording Artists and Technological Development, 2 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT 
ISSUES 25 (2005) (discussing subsidizing creation through revenue gathered by levies on copying 
equipment). 
 35. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright 
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281–91 (1970) (discussing 
the potential for government grants and prizes to accomplish the goals of copyright); Ruth 
Towse, Copyright and Artists: A View from Cultural Economics, 20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 567 (2006). 
This discussion also is found in patent law. See, e.g., William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, A Prize 
System as a Partial Solution to the Health Crisis in the Developing World (Harvard Law School, 
Discussion Paper No. 5, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
Fisher_Prizes12.pdf. 
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create.36  Even if copyright is preferable to these methods, there is no 
particular reason why it is the infringer who should compensate the 
author.  The author’s incentives will be equally secure if, upon 
infringement, he is compensated by a government-compensation 
scheme, an insurance policy, or a random third party.  All that is 
required is compensation from someone. 
This Article argues that the relationship between author and 
infringer stems from copyright’s second function: the correction of past 
injustices.37  The law initially recognizes the author’s copyright for a 
number of reasons: some economic,38 some based on natural rights,39 
and others based on visions of a good society.40  When a user interacts 
with the work, that user ought to respect the legitimate rights of the 
author.  In turn, the author must equally respect the rights of the 
user, such as fair use.41  When the user infringes copyright, he creates 
 
 36. Some authors go as far as to say the existence of modern peer-to-peer technology 
makes copying so easy that we must partially abandon the traditional copyright protection model 
in favor of greater reliance on compulsory licensing. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Impose a 
Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 
(2003); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653 (2005). 
 37. Other authors have discussed the issue of corrective justice in copyright, but no one 
has made a basic case for the existence of a corrective justice norm in copyright infringement. 
See generally, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 203 (2012) [hereinafter Balganesh, Normativity]; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory 
Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012) 
[hereinafter Balganesh, Obligatory Structure]; Eric R. Claeys, Private Law Theory and Corrective 
Justice in Trade Secrecy, 4 J. TORT L. 1 (2011) (taking the discussion of corrective justice in 
copyright and applying it to trade secret law); Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Is Not About 
Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 108 (2012); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter 
Gordon, On Owning]; Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 
LEGAL THEORY 347 (1997) (using corrective justice as a lens through which to view fair use).   
 38. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at 
326. 
 39. See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13–33 (1996); 
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32–67 (2011) [hereinafter MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY]; Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual 
Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Epstein, Liberty Versus Property?, supra note 4, at  
20–27; Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy 
of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. 
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155 (2002); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of 
Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1 (1994); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal 
Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 425 (1984); 
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
517 (1990).  
 40. See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 189–99 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed., 2001); Neil W. 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). 
 41. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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an inequality.  The author loses something and the infringer gains 
something.  The author loses the work’s market value, while the 
copyist receives a copy of the work without obtaining the author’s 
consent and without paying the relevant license fee.  The law operates 
to correct the wrongful losses and gains made.  By making the 
infringer compensate the author, the law annuls the inequality and 
puts the parties back into the positions they occupied prior to the 
infringement. 
While copyright scholars have recently expressed the need to 
supplement society’s views of copyright with noneconomic theories,42 
the academy has overlooked the importance of corrective justice.  This 
is a serious failing.  While this Article does not claim corrective justice 
is the sole purpose of copyright infringement cases, it does assert that 
corrective justice is important and too easily forgotten.  Maximizing 
welfare may well be the primary purpose of the law, but it is pursued 
subject to the constraints of fairness and individual responsibility 
imposed by copyright infringement’s secondary goal: corrective justice.  
When scholars and lawmakers forget this function of copyright, the 
law can become unfair.  This Article will highlight three example 
areas in which the law is currently unjust from a corrective justice 
perspective: the availability of statutory damages for willful 
infringement in civil cases, attorney’s fees, and mass  
copyright-infringement suit settlements. 
Part I summarizes the literature on tort’s purposes.  While the 
economic theory struggles to explain the relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant, corrective justice theory explains this 
relationship intuitively. Part II discusses the purposes of copyright 
infringement law.  Again, the economic theory does not satisfactorily 
explain the relationship between the author and infringer, but the 
corrective justice theory illuminates this aspect of the law.  Part III 
considers three areas where the law currently fails to achieve 
corrective justice and demonstrates how the law ought to be reformed. 
I. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE IN TORT LAW 
A. The Economic Theory of Tort Law 
Accidents negatively affect welfare.  To reduce the number of 
accidents, tort law exists to deter unreasonably dangerous conduct.43  
 
 42. See, e.g., ROBERTA R. KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (2010); MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 
39; MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE (2012). 
 43. See Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits, supra note 6, at 544 (“[Tort] law imposes duties 
to avoid unreasonable behavior that could cause strangers harm . . . .”).  
2014] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 259 
By making a tortfeasor responsible for the harm he causes, the law 
encourages people to internalize the costs of their actions, thus 
providing private incentives to prevent the accident.44  This process is 
most clearly observed in strict-liability cases, such as liability for  
ultra-hazardous blasting.45  A person who deliberately causes an 
explosion will be liable for any harm that results.46  If the blasting 
harms a neighboring house, for example, the blaster must compensate 
the owner for the harm.47  The blaster therefore takes these potential 
costs into account and will try to reduce the risk to nearby people and 
property. 
This does not mean that tort law attempts to prevent all harm 
in all instances.  Often the cost of prevention will outweigh the costs of 
the accident itself.48  A common example is that of driving cars.  
Automobiles cause many accidents that could be eliminated by 
making motoring illegal. Naturally, such laws are not passed because 
the costs of prohibiting automobiles would outweigh the benefits of 
preventing accidents.  In these cases, the law tries to minimize the 
aggregate costs of two variables: the cost of the accident and the costs 
of prevention.49 
Under a strict-liability standard, the defendant assumes 
responsibility for the costs of the accident and the costs of prevention 
and will accordingly act in a way to minimize that cost.50  But more 
commonly, this tradeoff exists in the domain of negligence law.51  In 
such cases, the defendant shall only be liable for actions that are 
“unreasonable” (i.e., when the costs of the accident are greater than 
the costs of preventing the accident).52  For example, imagine a patron 
 
 44. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 325 (the economic essence of tort is that it 
internalizes externalities, thus providing the socially optimal incentives for private actors). 
 45. See id. at 338–41. 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. For law on ultra-hazardous activity, 
see, for example, Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 
S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Robert W. James, Absolute Liability for Ultrahazardous 
Activities: An Appraisal of the Restatement Doctrine, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 269 (1949); Andrew O. 
Smith, The Manufacture and Distribution of Handguns as an Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 369 (1987).  
 47. See Smith, supra note 46, at 382.  
 48. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 336–38. 
 49. See id. at 336. 
 50. See id. at 340. 
 51. See id. at 342–45. 
 52. See In re City of New York v. Agni, 522 F.3d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur analysis 
under the Hand formula leads us to compare a relatively small burden of adequate precautions 
with a very small risk of great harm. . . . Judge Hand’s test is really more of an analytic 
framework than an actual formula into which we could plug rough numerical estimates of 
burdens and injuries . . . .”); Shanklin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 369 F.3d 978, 997 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“When a jury makes a negligence determination, its determination can be likened, using the 
famous ‘Hand formula,’ to a balancing of the burden on the defendant in acting more carefully 
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who sues a café owner when that patron is injured after slipping on an 
uneven floor.  If the harm caused totals $100, and the cost of repairing 
the floor is $50, then the defendant will be liable for taking 
unreasonable risk.  On the other hand, if the cost of mending the floor 
is $150, then the defendant’s actions were not negligent.53  In such 
cases, the tortfeasor is incentivized to prevent only inefficient 
accidents.54 
Yet, a question still remains.  The law gives incentives for 
actors to take efficient levels of care, but who exactly should be given 
the incentive?  Often more than one person could avoid the accident.  
In the ultra-hazardous blasting example, making the defendant liable 
for the harm incentivizes him to avoid the accident.  Not making the 
defendant liable, however, results in the victim bearing the loss and 
therefore giving the victim an incentive to avoid the accident (e.g., by 
moving the property away from the blast zone).55  Likewise, in the 
negligence example, either the café owner or the patron could have 
taken care to avoid the accident. 
To answer this question, the law relies on the concept of the 
least-cost avoider.56  This approach makes the person who can avoid 
the accident at the cheapest possible cost responsible for the loss.57  In 
the strict-liability example, the neighboring property owner could 
avoid the harm by moving his house.  But moving the property would 
be very costly.  It is better to make the defendant liable in these cases 
because he can more cheaply avoid the accident (e.g., by limiting the 
effects of the explosion).58 
 
against the probability of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm if the defendant does not so 
act.” (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)), rev’d on other 
grounds, 529 U.S. 344 (2000)); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947) (where Judge Learned Hand offered the infamous formula for negligence: “if the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less 
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [is] less [than] PL.”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of 
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–36 (1972). 
 53. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW  
46–82 (2d ed. 1997). 
 54. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8, at 322–64. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972); see also Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the 
Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1992). 
 57. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 56 at 1060. 
 58. See id.; Gilles, supra note 56, at 1306. 
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B. Problems with the Economic Theory of Tort Law 
Tort law serves this economic function.59  Nevertheless, as a 
positive theory of law, it is hardly unassailable.  Scholars point out 
many problems with the theory, such as: (1) often people are not the 
rational welfare maximizers that economics supposes;60 (2) the law 
does not actually deter accidents;61 and (3) the economic theory does 
not take seriously the views of those who actually practice the law.62  
As a result, many of the economic theorists do not believe that the law 
is solely dictated by efficiency concerns, but displays other important 
functions.63 
It is unnecessary to repeat all of the problems with the 
economic theory here.  Yet one of those problems will be salient in 
demonstrating how corrective justice works.  That is, the economic 
theory struggles to explain the relationship between the plaintiff and 
defendant.  This can be broken down into two further arguments: the 
theory’s difficulty in explaining the bilateral structure of tort law and 
the theory’s failure to account for the role of causation. 
 
 59. See sources cited supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13–59 (Cass R. Sunstein 
ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–10 (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000); see also JUDGMENT AND UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahnemen et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter UNCERTAINTY]; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 
(1998). These ideas have also had some impact on court decisions. See, e.g., Schwade v. Total 
Plastics, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[O]ne possible attraction of 
hindsight bias is that it may be quite flattering to represent oneself as having known all along 
what was going to happen.” (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 429 (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, eds., 1982))); 
Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 1354711, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 21, 2002) (“Of course, we do know that not everyone behaves in a way that economists deem 
‘rational.’”). For the application of behavioral law and economics to copyright, see, for example, 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 33 
(2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2010); Christopher Buccafusco et al., What’s a Name 
Worth?: Experimental Tests of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 106). 
 61. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort 
Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of 
Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 152–53 (1994); see also Christopher J. Bruce, 
The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical 
Literature, 6 L. & POL’Y 67 (1984). 
 62. See William Lucy, Method and Fit: Two Problems for Contemporary Philosophies of 
Tort Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 605, 610–12 (2007). 
 63. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 27 (7th ed. 2007) (“But there 
is more to notions of justice than a concern with efficiency.”). 
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1. Tort’s Bilateral Structure 
Tort litigation is bilateral, or two-sided.  A plaintiff sues a 
defendant, asserting the defendant caused him wrongful harm and 
therefore owes the plaintiff compensation.64  This bilateral structure is 
somewhat puzzling in the economic interpretation of tort.65  The 
deterrence goal could be achieved through various mechanisms, none 
of which require treating the defendant and plaintiff together in this 
fashion.66  This point can be illustrated through a number of 
questions.67 
To begin, why is it necessary for the defendant to compensate 
this particular plaintiff?68  The economic theory states that 
threatening the defendant with such liability will result in the 
defendant taking efficient care to avoid the accident.69  However, the 
need to deter accidents does not provide a reason why the defendant 
ought to pay this particular plaintiff.  If the only goal is to deter the 
defendant from causing the accident, all that is needed is to make him 
pay someone a penalty for causing the accident.  The defendant will be 
equally incentivized towards efficient behavior if non-efficient 
behavior results in him paying a fine to the government or a random 
 
 64. We can illustrate this bilateral structure by contrasting a typical tort scenario with a 
non-correlative method of resolving the issue. See PETER CANE, THE ANATOMY OF TORT LAW 12 
(1997). When an accident occurs, both tort and insurance schemes provide compensation, but the 
relevant parties implicated by the operations are different. See id. In tort cases, the plaintiff will 
claim that the defendant has committed a wrong and therefore caused injury. See id. If the court 
agrees, liability will be imposed on the defendant who must then pay the plaintiff a remedy. See 
id. Alternatively, in insurance claims, the victim will receive recompense not from a particular 
wrongdoer but from a pool of resources. See id. The compensation does not come from one person 
but from the group of people that contribute towards the insurance scheme. See id. The 
insurance claim does not focus on a bilateral relationship but on a multilateral relationship 
between everyone associated with the resource pool. See id.  
  The bilateral relationship between the two parties may also be substantive as well 
as structural, and a number of texts have demonstrated that the substantive content of legal 
rights must impose correlative duties on the other party in the interaction. See Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 
16, 30–32 (1913); David Lyons, The Correlativity of Rights and Duties, 4 NOÛS 45, 47 (1970); 
Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 L. & PHIL 537, 539 (2009); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (holding that the plaintiff cannot recover merely when someone 
breaches a duty resulting in harm, but can only recover when harm results from the breach of a 
duty owed to the plaintiff and correlated with his right). 
 65. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 46–48; Coleman, Structure, 
supra note 10, at 1250–53.  
 66. See, e.g., Don Dewees & Michael Trebilcock, The Efficacy of the Tort System and Its 
Alternatives: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 57 (1992). 
 67. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13–24; see also WILLIAM 
LUCY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 33–43 (2007) [hereinafter LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF 
PRIVATE LAW]. 
 68. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18. 
 69. See supra Part I.A. 
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third party (such as a charity).70  It is paying the fine that provides the 
necessary incentives, not where that fine ultimately ends up.71  As 
Judge Richard Posner explains: “that the damages are paid to the 
plaintiff is, from the economic standpoint, a detail.”72 
Or the same problem can be approached from the opposite 
direction.  Why is it necessary that the plaintiff sue this particular 
defendant?73  Economists would answer that this defendant is the  
least-cost avoider and therefore the person best placed to avoid the 
accident in the most efficient way.74  By publicly holding this least-cost 
avoider liable, other similarly situated least-cost avoiders in the future 
will be given an ultimatum: act efficiently or bear the costs of 
liability.75  But there is often little reason to think the defendant is the 
least-cost avoider.  It may be true that he is the least-cost avoider—or, 
more precisely, a lesser-cost avoider—when compared to the plaintiff, 
but that says little about third parties.  It is quite possible that a third 
party is in fact the best positioned to avoid the accident.76  To return 
briefly to the automobile example, many car accidents are the result of 
excessive speed.  It could be the case that the car manufacturer is best 
placed to avoid these harms, simply by restricting the speed at which 
its car can drive.  Yet, the victim in such a case does not sue the 
manufacturer, nor is there any requirement on the victim to show that 
the defendant he does eventually sue is the real least-cost avoider.77  
This is the case even when the cost of identifying the real least-cost 
avoider is comparatively low.78 
One can also ask, why is it necessary for the defendant to pay 
anyone at all monetary damages?  The costs incurred in the tort are 
sunk; the car in the road traffic accident is already dented, and the 
property near a blast site is already demolished.79  No matter what the 
court does, that will not change.  It does not matter if the court makes 
the defendant responsible for these costs or leaves them with the 
plaintiff.  On the other hand, redistributing the costs from the plaintiff 
to the defendant creates further expenditure because litigation 
requires time and resources.  The economic theory responds that 
 
 70. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18. 
 71. See id. 
 72. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 143 (2d ed. 1977). 
 73. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 17–18. 
 74. See supra Part I.A. 
 75. See supra Part I.A. 
 76. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18; Coleman, Structure, 
supra note 10, at 1241–42. 
 77. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18–19.  
 78. See id. at 19–20; Coleman, Structure, supra note 10, at 1241–42. 
 79. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16. 
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holding the defendant liable in this case will incentivize defendants in 
the future into taking efficient care.80  But this does not justify 
redistributing the costs in any particular case.81  If lawmakers want to 
change the incentive structure for future actors, they can simply make 
a public announcement that, in the future, a fine will punish such 
conduct.  The efficiency of future actors is important but it does not 
make costly litigation in this case necessary when there are other 
equally good ways to create incentives. 
Underlying all of these related issues is one fundamental 
problem: the economic theory is entirely forward looking.82  It seeks to 
justify the tort case solely by the effects it will have in the future.83  
But the basic features of the tort case are backwards looking.  The 
actors involved are determined by a historical event, and they argue 
over the details of something that already has occurred.  It is not clear 
why these backward-looking features are necessary to produce good 
economic results in the future.84  If the economic analysis were 
unquestionably correct, then defendants and plaintiffs would be 
selected by their relationship to the forward-looking goal of cost 
reduction.  The law would define the injurer and victim in a way that 
would best reduce costs tomorrow.85  Yet the law does not select 
defendants and plaintiffs due to their relationship to a  
forward-looking goal, but instead because of their relationship to one 
another.86 
 
 80. See id. at 18; supra Part I.A. 
 81. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16. 
 82. See id. at 16–18. 
 83. See id. 
 84. There is naturally a debate within the economic community over the efficiency of the 
bilateral litigation model. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of 
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law 
Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1993). There have been notable arguments that this system is 
not efficient. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 1097–1102 (2001); Stephen Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 
555 (1985). However, even if as an empirical matter economists could prove the efficiency of the 
system, non-economists would still find fault in the theory. In such a case, the problem would be 
that the economic theory makes the structure contingent upon its efficiency. Presumably, if it 
were not efficient, the economists would abolish it in favor of something else. However, it is not 
clear whether that would happen in reality, if this structure were inefficient. It is not clear that, 
upon a showing of inefficiency, the victim would automatically lose their right to receive 
compensation from their injurer. See, e.g., Lucy, supra note 62, at 613–14. Non-economists would 
say there is a fairness concern that would justify this practice nonetheless. 
 85. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 16–18. 
 86. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 47 (“Efficiency might as easily 
be served by two different funds, one that receives tort fines from inefficient actors and another 
that disburses the indicated inducements to victims. Instead of linking each party to the other, 
economic analysis construes the presence of both as a consequence of combining incentives that 
are independently applicable to each.”). 
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2. Actual Causation 
The economic analysis also struggles to explain substantive 
doctrines that exist to link the parties together.  One example is the 
requirement of actual causation.87  A defendant will not be liable 
unless her particular actions cause the harm that the plaintiff 
complains about.88  This is often known as the “but-for test”; that is to 
say, a defendant will not be liable unless the accident would not have 
occurred but for his actions.89  It is the plaintiff’s task to show 
empirically how the defendant’s actions satisfy this test.90 
The economic theory struggles to explain why this is a 
necessary part of the law.  The law’s goal in this theory is welfare 
maximization.91  By making the least-cost avoider liable, the law gives 
future least-cost avoiders the incentive to take efficient levels of care.92  
Once that is considered the goal, however, the only relevant question 
for the judge in any case is which party is the least-cost avoider?  If it 
was the defendant, then the defendant should be responsible for the 
loss; if it was the plaintiff, then the defendant should not be held 
responsible.  But where then is the necessity of discussing causation?  
Discussion of who caused whom harm is simply a waste of time if the 
judge will decide purely on the basis of who is the least-cost avoider.  
Thus, the positive economic theory, as Richard Wright points out, 
“merely skips over” the causation requirement.93  As a result, 
proponents of the economic theory have failed to define any content to 
the doctrine.  Ronald Coase suggested focusing not on causation, but 
on whose actions were simply more efficient.94  Likewise Judge Guido 
 
 87. See id. at 47–48; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987) (“[T]he idea of causation can largely be dispensed with in an 
economic analysis of torts . . . .”). 
 88. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 
41, 42 (5th ed. 1984); OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 73 (M. Holmes, ed., 1963). 
 89. See, e.g., D. M. A. Strachan, Variations on an Enigma, 33 MOD. L. REV. 378, 386 
(1970). 
 90. See id. at 390.  
 91. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 46–47. 
 92. See supra Part I.A.  
 93. Richard W. Wright, Actual Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of 
Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 438 (1985) [hereinafter Wright, Actual Causation]. It 
is true that today causation remains as one of the basic and most decisive features of tort cases. 
See, e.g., Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2013) (No. 12-484) (certiorari granted for determining proper 
standard of causation of Title VII retaliation claims), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Mitchell v. 
Gonzales, 54 Cal. 3d 1041 (1991) (on the substantial factor necessity in California causation 
doctrine); Cowart v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. 2010) (holding that a plaintiff is required to 
provide expert evidence of causation in negligence cases involving specialized medical questions). 
 94. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1960). 
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Calabresi called the term “causation” a “weasel word”95 devoid of 
meaning.  Today’s modern proponents of the economic theory also 
acknowledge that the economic understanding of causation is 
“admittedly far from the language and concepts in which the courts 
analyze these cases.”96 
This economic view is unacceptable as a positive theory of the 
law.97  Causation is one of the most prominent features of tort.  It is 
historically one of the basic doctrines the law hinges on, and today no 
tort textbook or class could seriously omit it.  Causation has been a 
central feature of tort since its inception, yet the classical economic 
analysis does not seek to explain or justify it.98  Instead it begs the 
question; why still discuss causation at all?  Are lawyers simply so 
ridiculous that they will cling to such vacuous and empty concepts?  
Or is the pure economic answer incorrect, and causation actually has 
some meaningful place in the law? 
C. Corrective Justice Theory of Tort Law 
Corrective justice theory views tort law as a system for 
correcting the wrongful losses and wrongful gains that arise from a 
tortious transaction.99  It states that those who cause wrongful loss 
have a duty to repair the loss.100  This Aristotelian theory begins from 
the position that people are equally entitled to their holdings 
(including their physical property as well as their legal rights).101 
When people interact with one another, certain norms govern their 
interactions.  They ought to respect the right of the other person to 
their holdings as much as they respect their own rights.  Torts break 
that balance and cause an inequality;102 one party gains something 
and the other party loses something.  When a thief steals a car, the 
 
 95. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6–7 
n.8 (1970) [hereinafter CALABRESI, COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]; see also Guido Calabresi, Concerning 
Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 105 (1975) 
[hereinafter Calabresi, Concerning Cause] (talking about the “alien language” of causation).  
 96. William Landes & Richard Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 134 (1983). 
 97. See Wright, Actual Causation, supra note 93, at 435. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4 (Martin Ostwald, trans., 1962); 
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 277 (1994). 
 100. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 15 (“[The] principle states 
that individuals who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair the 
losses.”); WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 56–83; Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002) (“Corrective justice is the idea that 
liability rectifies the injustice inflicted by one person on another.”). 
 101. WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 62. 
 102. Id. at 61–66. 
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thief gains something, and the victim loses something: the car.  When 
an attacker strikes a victim, the attacker gains the freedom to serve 
his own purposes, while the victim loses freedom of action as he is 
forced into a situation not of his choosing.  Tort law exists to correct 
the inequality.103  By making the defendant compensate the plaintiff, 
the law rectifies the unjust exchange.104  The remedy removes the 
wrongful gain and the wrongful loss while returning the parties 
roughly to the positions they occupied prior to the tort.  The role of the 
judge, as Aristotle phrased it, is to be “justice ensouled.”105  Like the 
statue of Lady Justice that stands outside the Supreme Court, the 
Aristotelian judge simply balances the acts of the parties and puts the 
actors back into equilibrium with one another.106  This theory was the 
traditional understanding of tort law prior to the rise of the economic 
analysis.107  It is still a view that many tort practitioners, as well as 
the public generally, hold.108 
The corrective justice account of tort law has validity as an 
explanation of the tort system because it renders intelligible 
something the economic theory fails to account for: the relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendant.109  Whereas the economic 
understanding struggles to explain the significance of the plaintiff-
defendant relationship, corrective justice makes this relationship 
intuitive.110  Most notably, it explains the bilateral structure of 
 
 103. See id.; COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13–24; Coleman, 
Structure, supra note 10, at 1240–52.  
 104. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 61–66; COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13–24; Coleman, Structure, supra note 10, at 1240–52.  
 105.  Robert L. Rabin, Law for Law’s Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2269 (1996) (quoting 
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 5–6 (1995)). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 58–66 (discussing the 
historical progression of Aristotle’s views); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private 
Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (2002). 
 108. One strain of jurisprudence says that we cannot understand the law unless we 
understand the views of those who practice it and was famously articulated by Hart, as the law’s 
“‘internal points of view’” or “internal aspect of rules.” See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
56, 89 (2d ed. 1994); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 11–15 (1998). The two most well-
known corrective justice theorists, Coleman and Weinrib, both ascribe to this view and believe it 
sets their account apart from the economic view. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 
15, at 6–10; WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 8–16. Coleman calls this “middle-
level theory.” See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at 6–10. Weinrib calls this the 
search for the “internal account” of tort law. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, 
at 8–16. 
 109. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1815–16. 
 110. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 56 (“Corrective justice thus 
treats the wrong, and the transfer of resources that undoes it, as a single nexus of activity and 
passivity where actor and victim are defined in relation to each other.”); see also COLEMAN, 
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 13–24. 
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litigation.111  The plaintiff must sue this defendant because it is this 
defendant who gained something from the tort.  Likewise, the 
defendant must compensate this plaintiff because it is this plaintiff 
who lost something in the encounter.  Only the transfer of the 
wrongful gain back to the victim restores equilibrium.  The 
redistribution in this case will not increase the amount of welfare 
because the costs of the accident are sunk, but it will equitably rectify 
an unequal distribution of harm.112 
As a result, the law is naturally backward looking.  If the 
function of the law is to correct a wrong that has occurred in the past, 
then the past will necessarily determine the aspects of litigation (e.g., 
the facts discussed and the litigating parties).  The parties are 
determined historically by their connection to one another, not by 
their relationship to a forward-looking, normative goal.113  The law 
looks backwards to determine who committed a wrong, and then tries 
to address that, rather than looking forwards to improve efficiency 
tomorrow.114 
This also helps illuminate the doctrine of causation.  Corrective 
justice puts causation center stage.115  The theory states that only 
those who actually cause wrongful loss have a duty to repair the 
loss.116  The centrality of causation flows from corrective justice’s 
position as a transactional norm.117  It states that, when people 
interact with each other, they ought to do so in certain ways and 
refrain from certain conduct.118  Disobeying these interactional rules 
 
 111. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 63 (“[B]ecause the plaintiff has 
lost what the defendant has gained, a single liability links the particular person who gained to 
the particular person who lost. Without some conception such as Aristotle’s, private law’s linking 
of the particular parties becomes a mystery”). 
 112. The issue is therefore one familiar to economic discussion. The economic analysis of 
law focuses on the allocative efficiency properties, hoping to increase the total amount of welfare. 
But it does not question the ultimate distribution of welfare. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 296 (1987) (discussing the unimportance of distributive 
concerns). 
 113. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 18. 
 114. See id.  
 115. While economists picked up and ran with the realist disbelief in the cause concept, 
philosophers and jurisprudence scholars maintained there is a real meaning to the concept. See, 
e.g., H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 59–63 (2d ed. 1985); Richard A. 
Epstein, Toward a General Theory of Tort Law: Strict Liability in Context, 3 J. TORT L. 6 (2010); 
Wright, Actual Causation, supra note 93, at 435. 
 116. See Wright, Actual Causation, supra note 93, at 435. However some are not as sold 
on the consistency between corrective justice and tort’s conception of causation. See, e.g., Larry 
A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1 
(1987). 
 117. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.  407, 410 
(1987). 
 118. See id. at 430. 
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gives rise to an unequal situation where the tortfeasor gains at the 
victim’s expense.  On the other hand, in the absence of an interaction, 
the gains and losses are not connected to one another.  In such cases 
the inequality is not the result of individual agency but merely good 
fortune.119  When asking whether the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 
harm, the focus is whether these gains and losses are the result of a 
singular, identifiable interaction.120  Causation is therefore the 
doctrine that requires the gains and losses to be linked together as 
flowing from the same wrong, rather than merely unconnected 
events.121 
However, as so far explicated the theory is purely formal and 
not substantive.122  It tells us what to do once an injustice occurs but 
not what is an injustice in the first place.123  Once legitimate holdings 
are not given equal respect, the law will rectify the situation.  But 
what counts as a legitimate holding?  And what is equal respect?124  To 
these questions, corrective justice theorists respond that people have 
some natural right to determine the content of their lives.125  Most 
notably, Professor Ernest Weinrib argues that Immanuel Kant’s 
notion of autonomy is inextricably linked with Aristotle’s theory of 
corrective justice.126  Each person has an innate right to determine the 
purposes of his life.127  Each person has an equal, natural right to live 
free from the interference of others.128  When a tortfeasor causes harm 
to another, he uses the victim to further his own ends, without 
respecting the victim’s equal right to lead his own life.  The tortfeasor 
subjugates the victim’s will to his own.  The result is an inequality 
with benefits to the defendant and losses to the victim.  The law 
corrects this situation to restore the balance. 
 
 119. See id.  
 120. See id.  
 121. See id.  
 122. See, e.g., LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 67, at 293–323 (discussing 
Weinrib’s scholarship). 
 123. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 66–68. 
 124. See Hans Kelsen, Aristotle’s Doctrine of Justice, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? JUSTICE, LAW, 
AND POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS BY HANS KELSEN 110, 125–36  
(1957) (arguing that the lack of substance to the Aristotelian concept made in a pure tautology 
that justice is simply the process of giving someone what he deserves). 
 125. Coleman views this as stemming from theories of liberalism. See COLEMAN, RISKS 
AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at 433 (arguing that the law stems from “equality, respect for 
persons, and their well being”); see also LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 67, at 
309–10 (describing Coleman’s approach). 
 126. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 84–113. 
 127. See id.  
 128. See id. Others also see some possibility for a substantive content to the concept of 
corrective justice capable of leading to definitions of justice. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, 
Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 625, 683 (1992). 
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This theory is attractive but still somewhat problematic.  While 
it explains important features of the law that are otherwise unclear, 
the theory probably does not explain every part of the law.129  Reliance 
on concepts such as autonomy to ground rights leads to indeterminacy 
in many instances.130  It is often unclear when one person’s autonomy 
should prevail over the autonomy of another.131  In a tort case, holding 
one person liable will often curtail their autonomy in order to uphold 
the autonomy of the other.  And while deep reflection on Kantian 
theory may resolve these issues, there is very little indication from the 
judiciary that their focus is solely on upholding Kant’s vision of 
autonomy.132  It seems more likely that, as Calabresi once said, tort 
law is a system of mixed goals.133  Society recognizes rights for various 
reasons, some based on efficiency, and some based on the right 
holder’s natural rights.134  Each highlights a different, but equally 
important, aspect of the system.135 
II. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Corrective justice is also an important function of copyright 
law.  While the economic theory fails to make sense of the relationship 
between the author and infringer, the corrective justice theory 
explains this aspect of the law intuitively. 
 
 129. For critiques of corrective justice theory, see Posner, The Concept of Corrective, supra 
note 25, at 188; Sugarman, supra note 84, at 603–11. 
 130. See e.g., Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 215 (“One might argue that the 
principle of autonomy gives no guidance because autonomy claims are always symmetrical. What 
one party wants, the other party does not want.”). Nevertheless Kantian approaches can be 
found in copyright. See, e.g., MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 39, at 
68–101; Abraham Drassinower, Copyright Infringement as Compelled Speech, in NEW FRONTIERS 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 203–24 (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012). 
 131. See Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 157. 
 132. Tort cases rarely involve highly detailed discussion of Kantian theory.  
 133. See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 95, at 100–01. 
 134. See Gordon, On Owning, supra note 37, at 156–57, 245–46. 
 135. See Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, supra note 25, at 629. Equally 
corrective justice is likely supported to some extent by another Aristotelian concept, distributive 
justice. See, e.g., TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT (1999); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999); Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice 
and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515 (1992); Stephen R. Perry, On the 
Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: 
FOURTH SERIES 237–63 (Jeremy Horder, ed., 2000). For a consideration of distributive justice in 
copyright, see Molly S. Van. Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535 
(2005). 
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A. The Economic Theory of Copyright 
The economic theory of copyright is based on the same 
principle of efficiency as tort law.136  Resources should be allocated 
towards uses that produce welfare.  In copyright, however, a market 
failure gets in the way of that goal.137  Authors often do not have the 
socially optimal incentive to create works.138  This is the result of the 
public-good nature of literary and artistic works.  Creating the first 
copy requires substantial up-front investment.139  A rational author 
would be unlikely to pay these up-front costs unless he will later 
recover the investment.140  To add to the problem, as the works are 
public goods, a copyist can easily duplicate the work and compete with 
the author in the market.141  In the face of this price competition, the 
author’s ability to recover the up-front expenses diminishes—and 
along with it the incentives to create the work.142  Copyright law 
intervenes to prevent this.143  With market exclusivity, the author can 
recover the up-front costs and receive the socially optimal incentive to 
produce the work. 
This theory is the “mirror image” of the economic 
interpretation of tort law.144  The ultimate goal in each is welfare 
maximization.145  Accomplishing this in each case requires 
manipulating the actor’s incentives (whether incentivizing the 
tortfeasor into taking care or incentivizing the author into creating 
works).146  The requirement for incentive manipulation stems in each 
case from a market failure caused by externalities.147  In tort the 
 
 136. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. For alternative theories to the standard 
incentive rationale, see, for example, Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative 
Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317 (2005); Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial 
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004); Tom. G. Palmer, 
Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 
(1998); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004). 
 137. See generally Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 26. 
 138. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at 
326. 
 140. See id.  
 141. See id.  
 142. See id.  
 143. See id. 
 144. See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 535. 
 145. See id. at 534; supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 535–37. 
 147. See id. The literature on how externalities affect intellectual property is varied and 
voluminous. See, e.g., Jerry L. Harrison, A Positive Externalities Approach to Copyright Law: 
Theory and Application, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2005); Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion 
Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065 (2006); Peter S. Menell, An 
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 
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externalities are negative—the tortfeasor overproduces torts because 
others bear externalized costs.148  In copyright they are positive—the 
author underproduces works because others would reap the 
externalized benefits.149  In each case, resolving the problem requires 
the actor to internalize the externalities.150  Holding the tortfeasor 
liable for damages internalizes those costs, creating a proper incentive 
for fewer accidents.151  Copyright protection allows the author to 
consider the long-term benefits of a work when deciding whether to 
invest in its creation.  The result in both tort and copyright is socially 
optimal activity. 
B. Problems with the Economic Analysis of Copyright Infringement 
Because the economic theory of copyright is similar to the 
economic theory of tort, it suffers from exactly the same problem.  It 
struggles to explain the relationship between the two parties, the 
author and infringer. This manifests itself in two ways. 
1. Copyright’s Bilateral Structure 
Like in the tort context, copyright holders enforce their rights 
through bilateral litigation.  The author sues the infringer for 
compensation.152  Using the same questions asked of tort law, it is 
clear that the economic theory does not provide a full explanation of 
why this bilateralism is necessary.  To start, why does the author have 
 
1058–71 (1989); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 1329, 1330 (1987); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized 
Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 42 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 155 (1994); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers,100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 257 (2007); Brett Frischmann, Spillovers Theory and Its Conceptual Boundaries, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 801 (2009).  
 148. See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 534. 
 149. See id. at 535. 
 150. See id.  at 535–37. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See, e.g., Balganesh, Obligatory Structure, supra note 37, at 1685 (demonstrating the 
bilateralism of copyright law). It is true that often modern copyright litigation is far more 
complex than a simple author versus infringer case. There are many third parties on both sides. 
On the right holder side there are assignees, license holders, publishers, record companies, 
collecting societies, etc., while on the infringer side there are websites that host infringing 
content, internet service providers, and peer-to-peer network operators. However, the existence 
of third parties does not change the basic case two-sided nature of the case before the court. Each 
case is a contest between one party that holds a right over the work and someone who has 
potentially infringed that right. Even in the case where there are more than one party on each 
side of the case, for example in mass copyright litigation, see infra Part III.C., the case is still one 
group of parties against another group of parties—much like a soccer match is a team sport but 
still bilaterally structured.  
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a right to sue this particular copyright infringer?  Economists would 
answer that providing the author with the right to sue provides an 
ability for the author to recover the fixed costs of creating the work 
and therefore increases the incentive to produce the work in the first 
place.153  If, however, the primary goal is to incentivize the creation of 
new works, then it is sufficient to reward the author for creating.  This 
can be accomplished through non-bilateral means.  The use of 
government subsidies is the leading example of this.154  Creation could 
be spurred simply by providing ex ante lump sums of money to 
authors without the need for any adjudicative system.155  Tax money 
would be allocated towards author’s fixed costs as it is allocated 
towards the salaries of those working in national defense or in the 
welfare state.156  Alternatively, institutions could award prizes to 
authors who produce the most popular works.157  These systems would 
make an exclusive right to copy and lawsuits for infringements 
unnecessary and avoid the cost of copyright enforcement and 
litigation.158 
 
 153. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. 
 154. Some authors have already commented on the similarity between the grant and the 
grant of government regulation via subsidies. See, e.g., 56 PARL. DEB. H.C. (3d ser.) (1841) 341, 
350 (U.K.) (Copyright is “a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.” 
(statement of Thomas B. Macaulay)); Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory 
Mechanism for Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 231 n.1 (2003); John F. Duffy, The 
Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 39–41 (2004). 
 155. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 257 (Birgitte Anderson ed., 2006); supra notes 12–14 and 
accompanying text. 
 156. See Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 136 (2005). 
 157. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 158.  Some commentators have already highlighted the potential efficiency of these 
alternative creation-incentivizing systems. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowtiz & Richard Watt, How to 
Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music? Copyright and Its Alternatives, 
20 J. ECON. SURVEYS 513 (2006); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus 
Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001); Peter Eckersley, The Economic 
Evaluation of Alternatives to Digital Copyright, SERCIAC (2003) (preliminary version), available 
at http://www.serci.org/2003/eckersley.pdf; see also Mark S. Nadel, Questioning the Economic 
Justification for Copyright, SERCIAC (2003) (draft), available at http://www.serci.org/ 
2003/nadel.pdf. While others recognize more generally that copyright litigation may be wasteful, 
see, for example, Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual 
Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003), equally, a number of lawyers have argued that 
creation will flourish in the absence of a copyright regime. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & 
CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); 
Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes 
Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121, 1150 (2007); Elizabeth L. 
Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011). These studies 
mostly concern the creation of fictional work, for information on copyright alternatives for factual 
works, see INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHT AND ITS 
ALTERNATIVES (Robert F. Brauneis ed., 2009). 
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Nevertheless, it might be that copyright itself is economically 
desirable.  The advantage of creating a property right is that it allows 
the author to license and sell the work at a price that the market 
sets.159  Because the market sets the reward, the author is given a 
price signal that accurately reflects the social value from the work. 
This therefore provides not merely an incentive to create the work but 
the socially optimal level of incentive.160  In this case, the right to sue 
the infringer is a second-best tool for the author to recover the fixed 
costs.161  Ideally, the copyist would pay the author for the right to use 
the work; otherwise, the court will hold the copyist liable.  Therefore, 
the author can still recover money to offset his initial investment.  Yet, 
this theory still fails to explain why upon an infringement of the right, 
the copyist should receive compensation directly from this particular 
infringer.  The author’s incentive will be equally well served if, upon 
an infringement, a government-compensation scheme, an insurance 
policy, or a random third party compensates the author.  The 
incentives do not rest on where the compensation comes from, only 
that someone (anyone) compensates the author and enables him to 
recover his costs. 
One could approach the same issue from the opposite direction.  
Why is it necessary for the copyright infringer to pay this particular 
author compensation?  The economic theory would say that making 
the copyist pay a penalty deters him and future copyists from 
breaking the law.162  But all that is required to deter infringement is 
to make the infringer pay a penalty to someone upon illegally copying 
the work.  This could be in the form of a criminal fine to the 
government or a donation to a third party such as a charity.163 
 
 159. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
355 (1967) (arguing that well defined property rights lead to internalization of externalities and 
efficient price signals). As a result some see the economics of property as the key to economics of 
intellectual property. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the 
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729–30 (2000). Others 
disagree fundamentally with this explanation for copyright. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, 
Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. (2006) [hereinafter 
Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend]; Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, 
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). However, some of this desire for strong copyright 
protection also flows from a natural rights perspective that authors deserve to control all uses of 
their work. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL 
JUKEBOX 10–11 (rev. ed. 2003) (Copyright maximalists “assert that copy[]right is rooted in 
natural justice, entitling authors to every last penny that other people will pay to obtain copies of 
their works.”). 
 160. See e.g., Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend, supra note 159, at 10. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See, e.g., supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text. 
 163. Criminal provisions are already partially relied upon for this goal. 17 U.S.C. § 506 
(2012). The current potential for imprisonment up to five years certainly acts as a deterrent for 
the most serious forms of copyright infringement. See generally I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal 
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Once again, there is the question of why compensation is 
necessary at all.  In tort law, the costs are sunk.164  The welfare 
reducing aspect of the transaction has already taken place.  This is 
exactly the same situation in copyright law.  The welfare producing 
part of the transaction has already occurred; the work in question is 
already created.  Nothing can change that fact.  If the court fails to 
hold the infringer liable, that will not reduce the enjoyment society 
gains from the author’s work.  Therefore, the only economic reason for 
making the infringer liable is the effect it has on future creation.  
However, if all that matters is creating incentives for future action, 
why make anyone liable in this particular case?  This forward-looking 
goal could equally be accomplished by stating that such copying in the 
future will result in the author receiving compensation from a third 
party. 
The fundamental problem is that the economic view of 
copyright is entirely forward looking, but the main features of a 
copyright infringement case are backward looking.165  The parties are 
not singled out because of their relationship to the goal of maximizing 
future welfare but because they are related to each other by some 
historical event.  The author sues the infringer not because doing so 
will encourage future creation but because the author feels that the 
infringer has hurt him and should compensate him for the damage 
caused. 
2. Copying and Independent Re-creation 
The next point is that the economic theory of copyright law also 
struggles to explain doctrines that relate the two parties together.  It 
 
Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 311 (2002); Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle 
of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469, 472 
(2011); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on 
Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 778–79 (2003); Sharon B. Soffer, 
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 491, 506 (1987). 
 164. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 165. Mark Lemley has already highlighted that two different forms of economic rationale 
are important in intellectual property theory. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). There is an ex ante view 
which states that intellectual property rights must be provided in order to induce creation and 
an ex post view which states continued control after creation will lead facilitate management of 
the goods economic potential. See id. Lemley critiques the ex post view and finds it at odds with 
the fundamental public-goods nature of intellectual property. See id. This view aids the 
argument made here that the only valid economic approach to intellectual property is forward 
looking. However, the point of divergence between my argument and Lemley’s is that I assert all 
of copyright cases (and probably all intellectual property cases generally) are necessarily 
backward looking in some measure. The issue before the court and the event they are concerned 
with are always ex post, or after the creation. The judgment the court provides has no forward-
looking goals which relates to these two parties and this event which they fight about. 
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is unclear why the copyright holder should only be able to enforce his 
right against those who actually copy his work.166  Unless the 
defendant actually duplicates an existing work, he will not be liable.167  
It is not a copyright infringement to independently re-create the work, 
even if the resulting works are identical.168  The question is whether 
this requirement is welfare enhancing. 
As an initial matter, one might think it is not.  Two reasons 
would suggest this doctrine is inefficient.  First, presumably the 
existence of identical works in the market place will harm the author’s 
incentives to create, regardless of how it is created.169  An 
independently produced work may still be a substitute for the author’s 
work and therefore harm his ability to charge a price above marginal 
cost.  This is largely the reasoning found in patent law, which does not 
have such an independent re-creation doctrine.170 
Second, independently re-creating works does not enhance 
welfare.  Simply reproducing a work does not add something new that 
society desires and demands.  For example, society already has 
produced Don Quixote.171  Anyone who obtains value from Don Quixote 
can already go out and read it.  Re-creating Don Quixote does not add 
anything new to that picture.  On the other hand, the process of  
re-creating Don Quixote actually harms social welfare.  The re-creator 
spends resources on the re-creation of a work that ultimately satisfies 
no demand.  This reasoning suggests society should deter independent 
re-creation rather than allow it.  One way to do this would be to hold 
the independent re-creator liable. 
 
 166. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936); Roworth 
v. Wilkes, 1 Campbell 94, 98, 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B. 1807); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT § 9.2, at 9:5 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT] 
(explaining that, in order “[t]o establish copying, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
mechanically copied the plaintiff’s work”); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law 
of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, at 511–14 (1945). 
 167. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1949) (stating that 
infringement consists of: “(a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted work and (b) that 
the copying (assuming it to be proved) went to far as to constitute improper appropriation”). 
 168. See, e.g., Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 450 (7th 
Cir. 2001). 
 169. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at  
344–47. 
 170. For a discussion of the efficiency of this doctrine in the patent context, see Mark A. 
Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525 (2007); 
Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defence in Intellectual 
Property, 69 ECONOMICA 535 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Prior User Rights, AM. ECON. REV. 92, 95 
(2006); Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 475 (2006).  
 171. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, THE INGENIOUS GENTLEMAN DON QUIXOTE OF LA 
MANCHA (1605). 
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In response to this argument, Professor William Landes and 
Judge Richard Posner make two counterarguments to show the 
efficiency of the independent re-creation doctrine.172  First, if the 
doctrine did not exist, future authors would spend time and incur 
additional cost searching for copyrights that they may infringe in the 
production of their works.173  The independent re-creation doctrine 
allows them to create without incurring substantial search costs.174  
And second, the likelihood of re-creating a work is quite low.175  Given 
the chance of re-creation is so low, it makes little sense to spend 
resources regulating the issue.176 
These arguments are not as conclusive as they may appear.  
Take the first argument.  Landes and Posner acknowledge that these 
additional search costs must be weighed against the greater incentives 
for the author to produce works.177  Nevertheless, they think that 
scrapping the independent re-creation doctrine would lead to many 
search costs and only few beneficial incentive effects.178  Therefore, it 
makes sense to retain the doctrine.179  But this approach seems to 
forget other important variables.  Eliminating the independent  
re-creation doctrine would have additional economic benefits Landes 
and Posner do not consider.  As discussed, independent re-creation is 
wholly wasteful.  Deterring it would prevent such wasted resources.  
In addition, the independent re-creation doctrine makes copyright 
litigation substantially more expensive.  In order to enforce the right, 
the author must demonstrate that the defendant copied the work.180  
But proving copying is very difficult.  Copying takes place in private, 
and, unless there are witnesses, the author must rely on the 
infringer’s admission of copying or circumstantial evidence.181  
 
 172. See Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at  
344–47; see also Varian, supra note 156, at 128. 
 173. Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, supra note 26, at 344–47. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id.  
 180. See e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 181. Due to the difficulties of proving copying, the court has modified the author’s burden. 
See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Jona Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977) (“In 
order to prove infringement a plaintiff must show ownership of a valid copyright and copying by 
the defendant. . . . Since direct evidence of copying is rarely, if ever, available, a plaintiff may 
prove copying by showing access and ‘substantial similarity’ of the two works.” (internal citation 
omitted) (citing Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751, 
753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 141 (1976))). Now copying may be 
inferred through a mixture of evidence that the defendant had access to the work and the work 
he created was substantially similar. See id. However, the court has never abandoned the 
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Therefore, while the independent re-creation doctrine does reduce the 
search costs of the second author, it is not clear whether that benefit 
outweighs the combined costs of decreased author incentive, the costs 
of proving copying in court, and the cost of using resources to produce 
a work that does not enhance welfare. 
Additionally, it may be the case that reintroducing some type of 
formality to copyright law could reduce the independent re-creator’s 
search costs.  Placing a requirement upon the initial author to insert a 
description of his work into a public database would substantially 
reduce the costs for follow-on creators while not requiring great 
expenditure on behalf of the original author.182  This, however, may 
not be a perfect solution in every case.  Naturally, complex works such 
as Don Quixote would not be perfectly describable, and the value of 
putting an ill-fitting description into a formal database would be less 
than optimal.  But even a limited description would give follow-on 
creators some indication of the works already in existence, and they 
could use that to start their search. 
The second argument is also far from fully persuasive.  The 
notion that independent re-creation is unlikely to occur depends 
entirely on how the law defines re-creation.  A work will currently be 
considered a re-creation if it is substantially similar to the original.183  
If the law defines substantial similarity narrowly, then independent 
re-creation is unlikely.  For example, if substantial similarity means 
verbatim copying, then it is very unlikely that a work like Don Quixote 
will ever be re-created.  However, if substantial similarity is very 
broad, then the likelihood of re-creation rises greatly. 
Currently, the courts favor a very broad view of substantial 
similarity.  Consider Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company.184  
 
necessity that sufficient evidence must demonstrate that the infringer copied the work. See id.; 
see also 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 9.2, at 9:5–6 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008); 
Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in 
Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (1990). For a discussion on the merits of 
the independent re-creation doctrine, see William Patry, Independent Creation: A Bulwark of 
Copyright, THE PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (June 22, 2005), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/ 
2005/06/independent-creation-bulwark-of.html. 
 182. For example, a number of authors have proposed reintroducing formalities recently. 
See, e.g., STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY, 
RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2011); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 
UTAH L. REV. 551, 562–63 (2007). However, others are less certain about the merits of such a 
scheme. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: 
A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010). 
 183. See e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468–69; Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright 
Decisionmaking: The Meaningless of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987). 
 184. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); see also BSS 
Studio, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 1999 WL 1427831, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (mem.); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 9.3, at 9:24–38 (2005 & Supps. 2006, 2011, 2012-2). The concept of 
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In that case, the plaintiff produced greeting cards with some original 
illustrations and some public-domain sayings.185  The defendant 
produced its own cards with somewhat similar illustrations and the 
same phrases.186  The trial court determined that the illustrations 
were not similar enough to constitute an infringement and that the 
phrases were not protectable.187  The appellate court did not dispute 
these holdings but found that if one aggregated the phrases, the 
illustration, along with the mood and sentiment of the two cards, 
there was substantial similarity between them.188  The defendant was 
liable for copying the “total concept and feel” of the card.189  This 
serves to demonstrate just how broad substantial similarity can be 
and accordingly demonstrates a high likelihood of re-creation.  If one 
can re-create merely by producing a work similar in concept and feel 
to a preexisting work, then the chances of independent re-creation are 
not as small as Landes and Posner suggest.  Therefore, there is 
substantial reason to believe that the necessity of copying does not 
further copyright’s economic goals. 
C. Corrective Justice Theory and Copyright Infringement 
The point of this Article is not to completely dismiss the 
economic theory of copyright.  Copyright in common law legal systems 
is still primarily a tool for increasing social welfare.190  However, 
beliefs and intuitions about fairness and individual responsibility 
constrain and structure what societies do in the name of welfare 
maximization.191  As a result, corrective justice is still an important 
part of the law.  In deciding copyright cases, courts not only attempt to 
maximize welfare, but also try to correct a wrong that the infringer 
has inflicted upon the author. 
The corrective justice theory of copyright infringement is as 
follows: Rights are assigned over the work.192  Primarily, the author 
receives the exclusive right to copy, and the user receives the right of 
 
substantial similarity may indeed be so wide as to threaten other doctrines limiting copyright. 
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 183, at 758–67. 
 185. See Roth Greeting Cards, 419 F.2d at 1109.  
 186. See id. at 1107.  
 187. See id. at 1109. 
 188. See id. at 1110. 
 189. See id.  
 190. See e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(stating that copyright is “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors”). 
 191. For a similar point on the relationship between personality interests and welfare 
maximization in copyright, see Balganesh, Normativity, supra note 37.  
 192. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
280 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:2:251 
fair use.193  Various arguments justify this distribution of rights.  
Some are consequentialist in nature, such as the economic theory or 
theories based on visions of ideal societies.194  Other reasons are based 
in natural rights theory.195  The author of a work has a certain amount 
of control over the work because he labored to produce it, and, in doing 
so, he imbued it with his personality.196  Thereafter, when parties 
interact, they have a duty to respect the rights of the other.  The user 
must respect the author’s rights just as the author must equally 
respect the user’s rights.  When the user does not respect the author’s 
rights, an inequality occurs.  The infringement allows the infringer to 
gain something at the author’s expense.  At this point, corrective 
justice theory states that the person who has caused wrongful loss has 
a duty to rectify the loss.  The function of copyright law is to restore 
the equality between author and infringer.  This involves removing 
the wrongful gain from the infringer and using it to compensate the 
wrongful loss of the author.197  In both tort and copyright infringement 
cases, the remedy puts the parties back in the positions they were in 
prior to the infringement and restores their antecedent equality. 
The question is what are the wrongful losses and the wrongful 
gains?  In a basic case, the wrongful loss is the owner’s lost revenue 
from the work, while the wrongful gain is the money the infringer 
saves by not paying the author the relevant license to copy the 
work.198  Take the situation where an infringer wrongfully produces a 
single copy of an author’s work.  The author loses the value that he 
could have made from licensing that copy, while the copyright 
infringer gains a corresponding amount, the amount of the unpaid 
license fee.  For example, if the license fee is set at five dollars per 
copy, the plaintiff has lost five dollars while the infringer has avoided 
spending five dollars.199  When the infringer pays the author the five 
dollars, it restores equilibrium and corrects the injustice. 
 
 193. See id. §§ 106–107. 
 194. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 10, at 4; WEINRIB, IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 61. 
 195. See WEINRIB, IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 10, at 74. 
 196. See Hughes, supra note 38, at 330–38. 
 197. It is less certain whether this is an appropriate goal of patent law and some have 
argued against such an approach. See Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law  
“Private Law” Remedies, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1932834; cf. Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 234 (2014) (arguing that the public’s interest in efficiently resolving patent 
disputes should be considered). 
 198. See Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §14.02 (1987)). 
 199. Courts sometimes use alternative language to measure the lost market value in 
these cases. Sometimes they say the lost market value is the lost sales themselves. See, e.g., 
Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008) (actual damages set 
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Alternatively, consider the situation in which the copyist copies 
the work and freely distributes it to one thousand other consumers.  
Assume that the one-thousand consumers would have bought the 
work otherwise.  The author therefore loses the revenue from the  
one-thousand sales.  If he still charges five dollars per copy, he loses 
$5000.  On the other hand, the copyright infringer gains a 
corresponding amount by not paying for a license to distribute the 
work to the one-thousand consumers.  If the infringer had originally 
sought a license from the author, the author would have charged a 
price equivalent or higher than the amount he would have gained 
from making those one thousand sales himself. The minimum license 
fee the copyright author would likely accept would be $5000.  By 
bypassing the market, the infringer has avoided a $5000 license fee 
while causing $5000 in loss to the author.  Correcting this injustice 
requires the infringer pay the owner $5000. 
This theory makes the author-infringer relationship 
meaningful and intuitive.  Copyright cases are bilateral because the 
infringer has a duty to correct an inequality he caused.  The act of 
copying has allowed the infringer to gain something at the author’s 
expense.  To address this, the author must sue the infringer, and the 
infringer must hand over his ill-wrought gains.  Naturally, the judicial 
task is a backwards-looking one.  To do justice—undo the situation, 
redistribute the costs, and return the parties to the positions they 
existed in prior to the transaction—the court looks to the past. 
The theory also explains why it is necessary that the infringer 
copy the author’s work rather than merely re-create it.200  Like actual 
causation in tort law, the act of copying is the nexus between the two 
parties.  When someone interacts with the author’s work, the 
corrective justice norm requires that he treat the author’s rights with 
respect.  Copying the work unlawfully breaks that equality and results 
 
at approximately $50 because the defendant “infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs—the 
equivalent of approximately three CDs—costing less than $54 . . . .”); Design Res., Inc. v. John 
Wolf Decorative Fabrics, 1985 WL 2445, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1985) (“[D]efendant’s infringing 
pattern was sold at a price only slightly lower than plaintiff’s. It is, therefore, reasonable to 
assume that plaintiff would have sold the same amount of the copyrighted fabric as defendant 
sold of the infringing fabric.”); RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
On the other hand, sometimes the court frames the loss in terms of a lost license fee. See, e.g., 
Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG, 2011 WL 3862074, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The jury was instructed 
as to both the fair market value license calculation for actual damages . . . .”); Thoroughbred 
Software Int’l, Inc. v. Dice Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 800 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the actual 
damages were the license fees the plaintiff would have charged for the work’s use and 
distribution if it were not for the infringement); see also 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 
166, § 14.1–1.1, at 14:4–22:3 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps. 2008, 2009, 2011-1, 2012-2, 2013). 
 200. Although not explicitly talking about corrective justice, Wendy Gordon has already 
shown how the copying requirement in copyright law is analogous to the cause-in-fact 
requirement in tort law. See Gordon, Mirror Image, supra note 6, at 536–37. 
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in correspondingly wrongful gains and losses.  On the other hand, if 
there is no copying, it is not the interaction between the parties which 
gives rise to the gains and losses.  The re-creation may benefit the 
user while causing losses for the author (who must now contend with 
a new work in the market), but these gains and losses are not linked 
together as the result of a singular interaction.  Much like the case 
where an infinite number of monkeys with an infinite number of 
typewriters could duplicate the works of Shakespeare, the re-creation 
is not the result of human agency but of mere fate.  The copying 
requirement is thus the judicial tool used to ensure that the gains and 
losses are connected as part of the same wrong. 
1. Copyright Remedies 
A basic function of copyright law is to correct the wrongful 
gains and wrongful losses that copying causes.  The remedy imposed 
by the court makes this goal a reality.  This is most simply seen in the 
actual-damages remedy.  The actual-damages provision requires the 
infringer to compensate the owner for the lost market value of the 
work.201  This situation corresponds to the examples just discussed.  
The infringer has bypassed the market and copied the work without 
paying the relevant license fee, while the author has lost the potential 
license fee or the profits to the unlicensed competitor.  Compensation 
puts the parties back on the baseline they existed in prior to the 
infringement.  But corrective justice can also be seen to operate in all 
of the copyright remedies, not merely in the provision of actual 
damages.  As this section will illustrate, corrective justice exists in the 
author’s ability to receive the infringer’s profits, the statutory damage 
regime, and the availability of injunctive relief. 
The law not only provides monetary remedies in the form of 
actual damages but also allows the copyright owner to receive “any 
additional profits of the infringer.”202  This additional remedy is a form 
of disgorgement damages and functions to compensate the author’s 
lost right to profit from his work.203  The author’s entitlement includes 
the right to receive profits through selling and licensing the work.  
When the copyist uses the work for financial gain, the author loses 
 
 201. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2012).  
 202. See id.; see also Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 512 
(9th Cir. 1985); Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,  
1172–73; 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.1.2, at 14:22.3–38 (3d ed. 2005 &  
Supps. 2008, 2011, 2011-1, 2012, 2012-2); Andrew W. Coleman, Copyright Damages and the 
Value of the Infringing Use: Restitutionary Recovery in Copyright Infringement Actions, 21 
AIPLA Q.J. 91, 92–93 (1993). 
 203. See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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part of his right—the ability to profit from the work.  This foregone 
gain is a loss and can only be remedied by the user returning the gain 
he has made from his unlawful exploitation of the work.  Consider 
again the case where the defendant copies one work that carries a 
five-dollar license fee.  Now imagine the defendant copies the work 
and sells the copy to someone else for one dollar.  The copyright owner 
has not only lost the license fee of five dollars but has also lost the 
chance to make an additional one dollar from the sale to the third 
party.  Therefore, the copyright owner must recover six dollars to 
correct the wrongful loss and wrongful gain. 
What, then, of statutory damages?  The law provides statutory 
damages in two situations.  First, where actual damages are hard to 
prove, the copyright owner can elect to receive statutory damages.204  
As Professor Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland have already 
demonstrated, this provision exists to serve a compensatory goal.205  
The owner frequently cannot prove actual damages, despite their 
probable existence.206  Take the previous example in which the copyist 
distributed the work to 1000 people.207  In order to prove actual 
damages, the owner must prove that these consumers would have 
bought the work from the owner were it not for the infringement.208  
But such a hypothesis is almost beyond empirical proof; it requires 
demonstrating the existence of a counterfactual reality.209  Allowing 
the owner to select a statutorily set amount provides compensation for 
a harm that very likely has occurred but is difficult to show.210  It is a 
form of rough justice, an attempt to correct the injustice that has 
occurred despite evidentiary difficulties.  The alternative would be to 
let many injustices go completely without rectification.  However, this 
cannot be said for the second case in which statutory damages are 
awarded.  This second case involves providing additional damages (up 
to $150,000 per infringed work) when the copying was both unlawful 
 
 204. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.2, 
at 14:39–64.1 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps. 2006, 2007, 2009, 2012-2, 2013, 2013-1). 
 205. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009); see also Oren Bracha, The 
Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The Life of a Legal 
Transplant, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1427 (2010) (tracing the evolution of statutory damages 
from the British Statute of Anne 1710 to present day); Priscilla Ferch, Statutory Damages Under 
the Copyright Act of 1976, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 485, 489 (1984). 
 206. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 446–51 (discussing statutory 
damages under the 1909 Act). 
 207. See supra Part II.C. 
 208. See 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, §14.1.1, at 14:8–12 (3d ed. 2005). 
 209. It is often difficult to guarantee the certainty of empirical proof. See, e.g., Steven 
Linen Assocs., Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F.2d 11, 15 (2d Cir. 1981); Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. 
Supp. 571, 582 (D. Mass. 1985). 
 210. See, e.g., Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 205, at 446–51. 
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and willful.211  This is a complex issue and will be discussed further in 
Part III. 
Finally, injunctions awarded by the court against the copyright 
infringer also serve corrective justice.212  In corrective justice, the 
purpose of the remedy is to restore the equality after an infringement 
and maintain that equality in the future.213  In this latter form, 
corrective justice may be better described as “protective justice.”214  
When there is a realistic threat that the infringer will continue to 
infringe in the future, the court will provide compensatory damages 
and an injunction.  As a result, “corrective justice operates not only by 
requiring the defendant to repair a wrong once it has occurred, but 
also by granting the plaintiff an injunction that prevents the 
defendant from extending the wrong into the future.”215 
III. CORRECTIVE INJUSTICES IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
Corrective justice is an important feature of copyright.  The 
infringer’s duty to rectify the harm is the principle around which 
copyright infringement is structured.  Sadly, courts and lawmakers 
often have forgotten this point.216  The focus is almost entirely on 
economic concerns, which leads to unfair laws. This section highlights 
 
 211. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 212. See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006); 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 166, § 13.2.1, at 13:33–46 (3d ed. 2005 & Supps. 
2008, 2012-2, 2013-1). Although corrective justice supports the use of injunctions in certain 
cases, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the circumstances in which they ought to be 
used. For a discussion of this issue from a non-corrective justice perspective, see, for example, 
Richard Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay -- Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-
Factor Freedom, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449 (2008); H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What 
History Teaches Us About Copyright Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law 
Requirement, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Jiarui Liu, 
Copyright Injunctions after eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS. & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012); 
James Thompson, Permanent Injunctions in Copyright Infringement: Moral and Economic 
Justifications for Balancing Individual Rights Instead of Following Harsh Rules, 7 S. CAL. 
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 477 (1998). 
 213. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 408 (1992). 
 214. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 1832. 
 215. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 94–95; see also James E. Duffy, Jr., 
Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
INC., THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 8 (1969). 
 216. For other instances of the corrective justice theory’s application to modern day 
issues, see, for example, Matthew D. Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warning, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (2007); Alan L. Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in 
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 577 (1997); Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional 
Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997 (1990); Elbert L. 
Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 741 (2000); 
Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury 
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348 (1990). 
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three areas that do not conform to the corrective justice function of 
copyright: statutory damages for willful infringement, attorney fees, 
and mass copyright-infringement settlements. 
A. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement 
In copyright, the author in a civil case can often receive 
heightened damages against the infringer when the infringement is 
willful.217  To the extent that these are punitive, these damages are 
unjust and in need of reform. 
1. Punitive Civil Damages Are Unjust 
Under the corrective justice theory, punitive damages are 
unjust.218  Punishment is an appropriate goal of criminal law but is 
not appropriate in civil cases.219  When employed in civil litigation, 
punitive damages overcompensate the plaintiff.220  Whereas 
compensatory damages return the parties to original position, punitive 
damages go one step further and create a new inequality.  The court 
forces the defendant to pay an extra-compensatory lump sum, while 
the plaintiff receives a windfall payment that he has no compensatory 
claim to.  This extra-compensatory fee is simply unnecessary to correct 
the injustice.221  And rather than put the parties back in their original 
positions, these damages make the plaintiff better off at the 
defendant’s expense. 
In copyright, the statute authorizes heightened damages in 
cases of willful infringement (up to $150,000 per infringed work).222  
Courts recognize the punitive function of these awards.223  This 
 
 217. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 218. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 169–74. As a result, other 
common law jurisdictions have chosen to limit their reach. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] 
A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (U.K.) (limiting punitive damages to the cases in which it already existed and 
preventing further expansion).  
 219. See WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 169–74. 
 220. See id.  
 221. See id.  
 222. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 223. See, e.g., On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of 
punitive damages—to punish and prevent malicious conduct—is generally achieved under the 
Copyright Act through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2), which allow increases to an award 
of statutory damages in cases of willful infringement.” (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02[B], at 14-23 to 24 (1999); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. 
Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1982))); Nat’l Football League v. PrimeTime 
24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp. 2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that statutory damages 
are “partially punitive” (citing RSO Records., Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952); U.S. Media Corp. v. Edde 
Entm’t Corp., 1998 WL 401532, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998))); U.S. Media Corp., 1998 WL 
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punishment rationale leads to damages that are very high and far 
beyond a compensatory amount.224  For instance, consider the case of 
UMG Recordings v. MP3.com.225  In that case, the defendant made 
digital copies of 4700 CDs to develop a music database.226  Sections of 
the database were then made available to customers who had lawfully 
obtained the CDs from elsewhere.227  MP3.com made little if any profit 
from its actions, and the plaintiff did not present adequate evidence to 
prove actual damage.228  Nevertheless, the court found willful 
infringement and awarded $118 million in damages, which the parties 
later reduced to $53.4 million through a settlement.229  Similarly, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed a $31.68 million statutory-damages award 
against the defendant in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures for the 
unauthorized retransmission of television programs.230  The punitive 
nature of these staggering awards has caused some commentators to 
call for their revisions.231 
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To the extent that statutory damages are punitive in nature, 
they are unjust.  Punishing the copyist may be an appropriate goal, 
but it should be confined to the criminal copyright provisions.  The 
current punitive nature of statutory damages for willful infringement 
allows the author to recover damages that go well beyond 
compensation and are unnecessary to rectify the wrongful gain and 
loss thereby arising.  Instead of returning the parties to their equal 
pre-infringement positions, the remedy serves to create further 
inequalities.  It inflicts a wrongful loss on the infringer, who must pay 
money for damage he did not inflict.  Simultaneously, it confers a 
wrongful benefit on the author, who receives a windfall payment for a 
harm he has not suffered.  This is simply not necessary to correct the 
injustice. 
2. Statutory Damages for Willful Infringement as Dignitary Harm 
It is not necessary, however, to abolish the concept of 
heightened damages for willful infringement.  It is enough to 
recognize the situations in which such heightened damages perform a 
legitimate corrective goal.  In various common law jurisdictions, courts 
award additional damages when the defendant’s willful actions were 
so egregious and wanton that they caused a unique form of dignitary 
injury.  In UK and Canadian tort law, courts award “aggravated” 
damages in cases in which the defendant’s intentional conduct 
demonstrates a blatant disregard for the plaintiff’s legitimate 
rights.232  When a defendant intentionally harms a plaintiff’s right, he 
not only harms a legitimate interest, but causes separate harm by 
treating the plaintiff’s legitimate interest as less worthy than his own 
interest.233  In that case, the damage award is consistent with 
corrective justice theory because it still performs a compensatory 
function: it compensates for the harm to the rights holder’s dignity.234  
In the United States, this theory has had less explicit consideration.  
Nevertheless, the theory garners discussion.235  Professor Dan Dobbs’s 
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treatise on remedies notes that in certain cases damages may reflect 
the inherent value of rights and that this sometimes may justify 
damages compensating for harms beyond simple pecuniary or 
emotional losses.236 
This suggests a legitimate reason for heightening the damage 
awards in cases of willful infringement.  The owner is a legitimate 
rights holder, and attacks on that status are harmful in addition to 
any lost license fees that may also result.237  A copyist who willfully 
disregards a copyright owner’s rights must compensate the owner for 
the affront to dignity as well as any economic losses.  In cases like 
MP3.com and Feltner, the owner should be able to argue that the 
infringer treated his rights with impunity and therefore the infringer 
should compensate him for any lost dignity. 
If, however, this is the only corrective justice rationale 
appropriate for imposing additional damages, the courts would 
necessarily impose these damages less often and in smaller amounts 
than is current practice.  First, it is likely that statutory damages 
under this theory would result in lower damages than seen in the 
cases such as MP3.com and Feltner.  The aggravated damage is still 
compensatory in nature, and therefore the damage is limited to the 
amount needed to compensate the copyright owner for his dignitary 
interest.  Such a calculation for nonpecuniary harm is necessarily 
complicated, but it is unlikely to yield a very high value.  Dobbs’s 
treatise notes that such dignitary interests rarely “warrant significant 
awards of money.”238  This is exemplified in defamation damages.  If a 
defamed plaintiff cannot show any actual damage, courts will only 
award nominal damages to compensate for the harm done to his 
position as a right holder.239  These can often be as low as one dollar.  
This suggests that dignitary harm alone will yield small statutory 
damage awards, a conclusion that is buttressed by the fact that the 
plaintiff has the burden to prove the existence of a compensable 
dignitary loss. 
Second, courts would not award these damages in cases in 
which the users reasonably believed that their actions were fair use or 
otherwise noninfringing.  Unfortunately, courts have previously 
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shown willingness to impose liability in such cases.240  In MP3.com, 
the users had a plausible, although ultimately unsuccessful, fair use 
claim.241  The copyists made little if any profit and the rights holders 
could show no actual market harm.242  Nevertheless, the court held 
them accountable for heightened statutory damages.243  Such an 
outcome is nonsensical under the corrective justice view of aggravated 
damages.  It is impossible to blatantly and wantonly disregard 
someone’s rights while simultaneously believing that your actions do 
not harm the other person’s rights.  To make a nonfrivolous claim that 
one’s use is noninfringing is the exact opposite of dignity harm.  It is 
an acceptance that the author has rights but a reasonable denial that 
they apply in this case.  Accordingly, honestly held beliefs that 
conduct is fair use or noninfringing should not result in heightened 
statutory damages for willful infringement. 
B. Attorney’s Fees 
Corrective justice supports the position that the losing party 
should pay the winning party’s reasonable legal fees.244  In a typical 
tort case in which the injurer harms a victim, the injury does not 
simply extend to the physical and emotional harms inflicted, but also 
includes the expense the victim incurred vindicating his right in 
court.245  The injurer’s actions forced the victim into paying attorney’s 
fees simply to uphold his legitimate right.  In order to correct the 
entire injustice, the injurer must remove this element of the wrongful 
loss.  Only by doing this will the victim be made whole and be restored 
to the pre-tort position he occupied. 
Copyright litigation currently follows the rule that each party 
pays his own legal fees.246  This leads to the problematic situation in 
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which the party with the greatest ability to pay for litigation is more 
likely to win the case.  In contrast, corrective justice suggests 
changing the rule so that the losing party pays the winning party’s 
litigation fees.247  The infringement has not only caused the author to 
suffer lost market value but has also caused him to spend resources 
vindicating his rights.  Only by making the infringer pay the author’s 
legal fees will the injustice be completely removed. 
Similarly, when the copyist wins the case, the author ought to 
pay the legal fees.  This is particularly important in fair use litigation.  
Professor Peter Menell and Professor Ben Depoorter have recently 
highlighted that many copyists are wary of relying on the fair use 
doctrine because of its uncertain applicability.248  To rectify this 
situation, they propose a system in which the author would pay the 
fair user’s litigation costs under certain conditions.249  Although 
Menell and Depoorter’s argument is economic in focus, it is also 
consistent with corrective justice.  The user’s fair use actions were 
entirely lawful and within his right.  The author has wrongfully 
brought a case and thus forced the user to incur losses in defending 
something that he was already legally entitled to do.  Therefore, to 
correct the injustice the litigation has caused, the author must pay the 
wrongfully incurred legal fees of the user. 
C. Mass Copyright Infringement Settlements 
In the corrective justice view of copyright, the wrongdoer ought 
to pay for the wrong committed.  This might seem a rather bland and 
unobjectionable statement.  However, in some cases, the law operates 
so that innocent people must remedy an injustice they have not 
caused.  This process can be observed in the current controversy 
surrounding mass copyright infringement enforcement campaigns. 
The term “copyright troll” refers colloquially to an author (or 
more accurately, the copyright holder) that files mass numbers of 
copyright infringement cases in the hope of extracting a damage 
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settlement from defendants as a revenue stream.250  The author works 
in conjunction with technology companies to monitor peer-to-peer 
networks.251  After discovering Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that 
are using these networks, the copyright holder files a  
copyright-infringement lawsuit against numerous (sometimes 
thousands) unnamed defendants.252  This allows the copyright holder 
to secure a subpoena against the relevant Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) to release the names and contact information of the people who 
own the computers associated with the IP addresses.253  After 
obtaining this information, the copyright owner sends out letters to all 
of the defendants threatening litigation for suspected copyright 
infringement, unless the defendant settles the case.254  The letters 
point out how high the statutory damage award can be in order to 
induce the defendant into settling the case quickly for only a few 
thousand dollars.255 
One example of this practice surrounds Kathryn Bigelow’s 
Oscar-winning film, The Hurt Locker.256  Voltage Pictures held the 
copyright to the film.257  In 2010, the law firm representing Voltage 
Pictures hired a company to monitor peer-to-peer networks for illegal 
downloading of The Hurt Locker.258  In March 2010, Voltage Pictures 
filed a lawsuit against five thousand unnamed defendants, later 
increased to 24,595.259  It then proceeded to send out  
copyright infringement notices to all of the defendants.260  More 
recently, the copyright holders of pornographic films have adopted this 
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method of revenue generation.261  In such cases, the copyright holders 
have relied partially on the stigma associated with their content in 
order to induce a quick settlement from people who would prefer not 
to be exposed as consumers—or even alleged consumers—of 
pornography.262 
This presents an unhappy situation in which innocent people 
pay copyright settlement fees.263  This may happen because of a 
number of reasons.  To begin, there is an evidentiary issue over 
whether the IP address identified actually downloaded the 
copyrighted work.  To gather the initial IP addresses, the copyright 
owner relies on software and monitoring services of a private, for-hire 
company.264  There is no legal oversight of this process, and there is a 
high potential for abuse.  From the author’s perspective, discovering 
the names of as many people as possible is beneficial regardless of 
whether they actually infringed the copyright.  A greater number of 
names offers a larger pool of defendants to whom the copyright owner 
can send infringement notices and settlement demands.  Some 
copyright owners may therefore have a motive to pursue people 
without strong evidence that an infringement has actually occurred.  
Alternatively, even in cases in which there is no malicious intent, the 
chance of erroneously naming an innocent defendant is substantial.  
When the author targets several thousand potential defendants at 
once, there is a chance that human error will lead to the author 
pursuing some people who have not actually infringed the work. 
Even when the author can definitively show that the named IP 
address downloaded the work, problems persist.  The current practice 
of equating the owner of the named IP address and the infringer is at 
best questionable.  Such a simplistic view does not take into account 
IP spoofing, whereby someone creates an IP address with the 
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intention of impersonating another IP address.265  Nor does it 
recognize that multiple people, not merely the owner, may use the 
infringing device.266  Even in cases in which the named defendant 
actually downloaded the work, his actions may well have been exempt 
from copyright infringement under a defense, such as fair use.267 
These problems make it likely that authors in these cases are 
demanding damage settlements from some innocent people.268  Of the 
pool of innocent people receiving these demands, many would rather 
settle the case anonymously than fight publicly in court.  Paying a 
settlement fee of a few thousand dollars may be preferable to 
litigation, in which the defendant would certainly pay substantial 
legal fees and risk incurring very high statutory damages if he loses 
the case.269 
Enforcing copyright through such mass-infringement 
settlements may well have cost-saving properties and may be 
consistent with copyright’s economic rationale.  Grouping defendants 
together is far less costly than pursuing thousands of defendants 
through thousands of individual cases.  The fact that the costs are 
reduced also enables the author to more effectively police his rights, 
thus increasing the probability of catching infringers holding them 
liable.  This enhanced enforcement increases the effective deterrence 
of the copyright law. 
However, to the extent that this practice enables targeting of 
innocent defendants, it presents a clear and unambiguous  
corrective justice violation.  These two parties never interacted before 
the litigation.  The innocent defendant has not copied the work and 
has not benefited at the author’s expense.  There is no injustice here to 
correct.  On the contrary, it is the action of the author that creates an 
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inequality.  The author wrongfully gains from the transaction; he 
receives a ransom masquerading as compensatory damages.  On the 
other hand, the innocent defendant is forced into a wrongful loss in 
the form of the settlement fee.  This is the injustice that the law 
should correct. 
The problem would largely disappear if the law adopted the 
proposals mentioned above in Parts III.A and III.B.270  If statutory 
damages for willful infringement were limited to compensation for 
dignitary harm they would be imposed far less frequently and in 
smaller quantities by courts.  Therefore, they would not pose the same 
threat to the innocent recipient of a settlement demand.  Furthermore, 
if the loser of the copyright case were responsible for the winner’s 
legal costs, the author would have an incentive to only send 
settlement demands to those who have likely infringed the work.  If 
the author sends settlement demands to people who have probably not 
infringed the work, then he risks paying the defendant’s court fees.  
He is therefore deterred from starting cases without proper evidence 
of infringement. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
That copyright functions to overcome a market failure is 
undoubtedly accurate.  In the common law world, an important goal of 
copyright law is to incentivize the creation of an optimal number of 
works.  However, it is simply a mistake to believe this is the only 
function of copyright.  The forward-looking goal of welfare 
maximization may lead to socially desirable outcomes, but it fails to 
provide a meaningful explanation of the relationship between the 
author and the infringer.  Instead, this bedrock feature of the law is 
the result of copyright infringement’s second function: the correction 
of past injustices.  The author has a right to copy the work.  When the 
infringer disregards that right, he creates an inequality.  The infringer 
bypasses the market, causing the author to lose revenue while the 
infringer copies the work without paying a license fee.  The law tries 
to eradicate the wrongful losses and wrongful gains, and to restore the 
parties to their original positions.  This process upholds the author’s 
status as a legitimate rights holder whose rights deserve the 
infringer’s respect. 
Sadly, lawmakers and scholars often forget about corrective 
justice.  Because copyright is understood in wholly instrumental 
terms, the noneconomic function of copyright litigation sometimes 
goes forgotten.  This is seen in the three cases discussed in Part III: 
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statutory damages for willful infringement, litigation fees, and mass 
copyright lawsuit filings.  Ultimately, society may be happy to accept 
these instances of unfairness if it leads to greater economic prosperity.  
However, to the extent that they run counter to the corrective justice 
function of copyright, they ought to be reformed along the lines 
suggested. 
 
